• George Gavrilis suggests a closer look at the resolution of the Tajik civil war for the type of state system that may eventually emerge in Afghanistan.  While it is an interesting thought, Tajikistan did not have the same ethnic and sectarian tensions Afghanistan did and nor was it a proxy playing grounds for its neighbors.
• Another look at the relative unknowns chosen as Europe’s President and Foreign Minister.
• How the fears of a swine flu epidemic may have been cynically used as a gambit in Ukraine’s presidential election.
• How Hezbollah has used a loophole in Shiite marriage law to satisfy the libido of its foot soldiers.
• Time for the gathering of the Muslim faithful in Mecca for another Hajj, this event being overshadowed by swine flu fears and the political drama from Iran.

As noted earlier, there seems little enthusiasm to create a genuine European state which would require an even greater surrender of national sovereignty to Brussels.  The Economist on how the process to select the new President will lead to a noneity whose words will carry little weight.  But even if the Europeans choose a stronger personality for the Presidency and for Foreign Minister, the larger European countries are unlikely to kowtow to the missives from Brussels.  With such an inherently flawed structure, the whole debate seems an exercise in futility.

With Czech President Václav Klaus backing down in face of the carrots and sticks offered by his exasperated European colleagues, it appears that it is only a matter of time before the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force.  As Europe draws ever closer to forming some sort of unified state, the public support for the new union appears underwhelming.  Not since the Act of Union in 1707 created the United Kingdom, does there appear to be less support in the public for the creation of a united state.  While the Europeans are not rioting on the streets like the Scots did in 1707, the ruling classes of Europe seem to be aware of the tenor of public opinion.

After the difficulty adopting the Maastricht Treaty and the debacle of the attempted ratification of the European Constitution, Europe’s leaders kept the decision out of the hands of its fickle electorate electing for parliamentary ratification.  Ireland, the only country to hold a referendum initially rejected it.  The economic crisis appears to have given the Irish a greater appreciation for being a part of Europe and a second referendum approved the treaty.

The irony of the European Union has been the undemocratic and bureaucratic framework it tossed on top of a league of democracies.  Public opinion in Europe has long been leery of the bureaucrats in Brussels and concerned about the implications of national sovereignty.  At the same time the national governments have been unwilling to devolve power to the directly elected European Parliament turning it into a debating forum.

Creating a European Union was an elitist if noble minded and practical concept to begin with, even if it has been extremely beneficial to Europe.  However, even with the Lisbon Treaty the European structure is likely to remain a somewhat weak confederation for the foreseeable future.  The European “Foreign Minister” appears likely to more of a liaison between the national governments than the creator of a “European” foreign policy.  The President will be an amiable figurehead with little executive power.  While the powers of the European Parliament are rising with each treaty, it still does not have the power of legislative initiative to initiate new legislation which must come from the appointed European Commission.

So while more driblets of power have been handed over to Europe, many things still remain the same.  The more powerful European States will still run their own foreign policy and there is no discussion of drafting something like the “Treaty Clause” of the United States Constitution which would assign this right to the European Government.  What the Lisbon Treaty does do is tie the economic bonds of the union even closer.  The practical result is that the smaller or poorer members who deviate too far from the line wanted by Germany and France (and from time to time the United Kingdom when it decides it is European) will be forced to toe the line or face reductions on their cherished subsidies.  This power cannot be used too often because it will aggravate the resentments the European public feels towards Brussels.

A United States of Europe will truly come into being only when the directly elected European Parliament and the executive branch truly obtain the initiative to direct policy independent of the member states, even the powerful ones like France and Germany.  If the European public is not enthralled by the current structure there appear to be no signs that the national governments are willing to surrender their powers to such an extent.  So for all the rhetoric and treaties, the answer to the question posited above is nobody.